

IT HAD BECOME MORE POPULAR IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR. YOGA REPLIED THAT IT HAD NOT GAINED MORE SUPPORT AND THAT ONLY APODETI FAVOURED INTEGRATION WITH INDONESIA.

HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT PORTUGUESE TIMOR AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE DID NOT MAKE SENSE AND THAT IT WOULD LOOK FOR OUTSIDE HELP AND PROBABLY GET AID FROM THE SOVIET UNION THEREBY ALLOWING THE SOVIET UNION TO ESTABLISH A FOOTHOLD IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

NEWSOM ASKED IF INDONESIA ASSESSES THAT THE SOVIET UNION VALUED ITS RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA MORE THAN AN ADVENTURE IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR. YOGA DEPRECATED THIS, CALLING ATTENTION OT SOVIET ACTIONS IN OTHER PARTS OF ASIA AND AFRICA.

NEWSOM ASKED WHETHER INDONESIA HAD CONSIDERED FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PORTUGUESE TIMOR LEADERSHIP AS A FACTOR IN THE SITUATION. YOGA SAID THAT INDONESIA HAD BEEN DOING THIS AND HAD PROVIDED WHEAT AND SUGAR BUT THIS HAD NOW STOPPED.

~~22 August 1975~~

VII.

SECRET

PORTUGUESE TIMOR

TO CANBERRA REPEAT DJAKARTA, WASHINGTON FROM LISBON

IT IS DISTURBING THAT SUCH A SENIOR AND (PRESUMABLY) HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON AS YOGA COULD BE SO MISINFORMED ABOUT PORTUGUESE POLITICS. IT IS SIMPLY NONSENSE TO SUGGEST AS YOGA DOES THAT "THE SOCIALISTS IN LISBON WERE PRO-MOSCOW WHILE THE COMMUNISTS WERE PRO-PEKING"...

AS YOU KNOW, CUNHAL (ALVARO CUNHAL, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY) IS OFTEN ACCUSED OF BEING THE MOST MOSCOW-ORIENTATED LEADER OF ANY WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOCIALISTS LED BY MARIO SOARES RECENTLY LEFT THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE PRINCIPAL REASON THAT THE AFM (ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT) RADICALS LED BY PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES SEEMED BENT ON ESTABLISHING A "POPULAR DEMOCRACY" ON THE EAST EUROPEAN MODEL. TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOCIALISTS ARE PRO-MOSCOW DISPLAYS A LAMENTABLE IGNORANCE OF THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SCENE.

YOU MIGHT CONSIDER THE NEED TO TRY TO EDUCATE YOGA ON THE FACTS OF POLITICAL LIFE IN PORTUGAL. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF ANY CRUCIAL

INDONESIAN DECISIONS AFFECTING TIMOR WERE BASED ON SUCH BASICALLY FALSE PREMISES.

~~23 August 1975~~

VIII.

SECRET

PORTUGUESE TIMOR

TO CANBERRA

REPEAT LISBON

FROM DJAKARTA

WE SEEK AS OPPORTUNITIES PRESENT THEMSELVES TO KEEP INDONESIANS UP TO DATE WITH INFORMATION WE HAVE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL. ONE PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IS THAT THE INDONESIAN (PARTICULARLY IN BAKIN) ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST PARTIES IS VERY DIFFERENT TO OURS. THE INDONESIANS ARE NOT GETTING MUCH INFORMATION FROM THEIR EMBASSY IN LISBON.

IT SEEMS THAT THERE IS NOT MUCH UNDERSTANDING ON EITHER SIDE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.

THE INDONESIANS IN DJAKARTA AND IN LISBON HAVE SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN TO THE PORTUGUESE WHY MAJOR SOARES RECEIVED THE TREATMENT HE DID.

~~23 August 1975~~

IX.

SECRET

PORTUGUESE TIMORE

TO DJAKARTA

REPEAT LISBON

FROM CANBERRA

WE AGREE WITH COOPER THAT IS IS DISTURBING THAT SOMEONE AS INFLUENTIAL IN INDONESIAN POLICY MAKING AS GENERAL YOGA SHOULD APPEAR SO SINGULARLY ILLINFORMED ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN PORTUGAL.

DO YOU THINK THAT YOGA REALLY HOLDS THE VIEWS ABOUT THE PORTUGUESE SOCIALISTS THAT HE CONVEYED TO NEWSOM? OR WAS HE SIMPLY TRYING TO EXPLAIN AWAY INDONESIA'S TREATMENT OF MAJOR SOARES? IN ANY EVENT YOU WILL NO DOUBT TAKE ANY SUITABLE OPPORTUNITIES TO CORRECT ANY INDONESIAN MISINTERPRETATIONS OF THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SCENE.

NEWSOM SAID THAT THE AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE PORTUGUESE SOCIALISTS MAINTAINED IDEOLOGICAL TIES WITH OTHER EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS RATHER THAN WITH MOSCOW. HE SAID THE RECENT ELECTION RESULTS IN PORTUGAL AND CURRENT TRENDS THERE WERE GENERALLY OF A NON-COMMUNIST CHARACTER. YOGA INSISTED THAT THE SOCIALISTS WERE PRO-MOSCOW AND THE COMMUNISTS PRO-PEKING.

TURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE RECENT VISIT OF MAJOR SOARES, YOGA SAID THAT SOARES HAD ENTERED INDONESIA WITHOUT A VISA AND THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAD HAD NO FOREWARNING OR EXPLANATION OF HIS PRESENCE IN INDONESIA. THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO SUPPORT THE STATEMENT THAT HE WAS AN EMISSARY OF THE PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT. WHILE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WAS ATTEMPTING TO CLARIFY THIS SOARES TRIED TO "SNEAK OUT" TO DENPASAR. SOARES CLAIMED TO HAVE A LETTER FROM THE PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT BUT BAKIN HAD DETERMINED THAT THE LETTER WAS NOT SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT. (NOTE: WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT BAKIN AGENTS SEARCHED HIS LUGGAGE.) SOARES WAS BELIEVED TO BE A MEMBER OF THE PORTUGUESE SOCIALIST GROUP (THAT IS, PRO-MOSCOW).

YOGA ASKED FOR A STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON PORTUGUESE TIMOR. NEWSOM SAID HE WAS IN A POSITION TO MAKE AN AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT BY VIRTUE OF INSTRUCTIONS RECENTLY RECEIVED (NOTE: ON 19 AUGUST):

FIRST, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAS NOT ANXIOUS TO BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR IN ANY WAY. APART FROM NORMAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERN FOR THE WELFARE OF THE POPULATION AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, THE MAIN UNITED STATES INTEREST WAS IN THE IMPACT OF ANY CHANGE IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR ON UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA.

SECONDLY, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE MERGER OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR WITH INDONESIA, ASSUMING THAT THIS WAS DESIRED BY THE LOCAL POPULATION.

THIRDLY, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE INHABITANTS AND TIMOR'S NEIGHBOURS.

THUS PEACEFUL MERGER WOULD CAUSE NO PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES. PROBLEMS COULD ARISE IF THERE WERE A FORCIBLE SEIZURE. THIS COULD RAISE DIFFICULTIES OF A KIND ENCOUNTERED WITH TURKEY ON THE QUESTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY IF UNITED STATES MILITARY EQUIPMENT WERE USED BY INDONESIA IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

NEWSOM SAID THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO PRESSURE THE OUTCOME IN ONE WAY OR THE OTHER BUT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT IF UNITED STATES EQUIPMENT WERE USED THIS COULD CALL INTO EFFECT SECTIONS OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AND COULD PLACE THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME IN INDOENSIA IN JEOPARDY. THUS THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE THE PEACEFUL INCORPORATION OF PORUTGUESE TIMOR INTO INDONESIA.

NEWSOM ASKED WHETHER PORTUGAL COULD REASSERT ITS CONTROL IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR OR WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS WERE POSSIBLE WITH THE LEADERSHIP GROUPS IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR. YOGA SAID HE FIRST WANTED TO MAKE THREE POINTS CONCERNING INDONESIAN INTENTIONS. THE FIRST WAS THAT INDONESIA WOULD NOT PROVOKE THE SITUATION IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR NOR LAUNCH MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST HER "PEACEFUL NEIGHBOURS". SECONDLY, INDONESIA WOULD NOT ABANDON HER CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. INDONESIA HAD NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. THIRDLY, IF INDONESIA HAD TO ACT SHE WOULD DO SO ONLY IF SHE FELT ENDANGERED AND PROVOKED. IF INDONESIA WAS OBLIGED TO ACT SHE WOULD PRODUCE THE PROOF (OF THE DANGER AND PROVOCATION). INDONESIA PLACED TOO HIGH A VALUE ON HER FOREIGN RELATIONS TO RISK AGGRESSION, AND THAT WAS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED PORTUGAL TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES

YOGA SAID THERE HAD BEEN SIGNS THAT THE UDT HAD ASKED PORTUGAL TO PUT AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFRONTATION OF FORCES IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR. IF UDT DISCOVERED THAT PORTUGAL WAS NOT WILLING TO INTERVENE UDT MIGHT INVITE INTERVENTION BY OUTSIDE FORCES IN THE NEIGHBOURING REGION. THERE WAS EVEN A POSSIBILITY THAT PORTUGAL WOULD SAY THAT IT WAS TOO FAR AWAY AND WOULD ASK INDONESIA TO RESOTRE ORDER IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

INDONESIA MUST KNOW THE ATTITUDE AND OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SINCE FOUR OR FIVE YEARS FROM NOW PORTUGUESE TIMOR MAY BE PRO-SOVIET UNION AND PRO-CHINA AND THEN THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT BE INDONESIA'S ALONE.

NEWSOM SAID HE WISHED TO CLARIFY HIS EARLIER STATEMENT ABOUT THE USE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES POSITION MAY BE DID NOT REST ENTIRELY IN THE HANDS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THERE WERE OTHER BODIES IN THE UNITED STATES (HE ALLUDED TO CONGRESS) WHICH HAD AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE. YOGA SAID HE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THIS.

NEWSOM ASKED ABOUT THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION. YOGA SAID IT WAS NOT FAR FROM THE UNITED STATES POSITION. AUSTRALIA HAD BEEN TOLD THAT INDONESIA WOULD STICK TO HER PROMISES. THAT INDONESIA WAS NOT AN AGGRESSOR BUT THAT IF ENDANGERED INDONESIA WOULD HAVE TO ACT AND IN THAT EVENT WOULD OFFER CLEAR PROOF- OF THE DANGER.

NEWSOM ASKED IF INDONESIA PERCEIVED THAT THE OPTION OF MERGER WITH INDONESIA HAD BECOME MORE POPULAR IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR. YOGA REPLIED THAT

OUT OF TIMOR; LEAVE EVENTS TO TAKE THEIR COURSE; AND IF AND WHEN INDONESIA DOES INTERVENE ACT IN A WAY WHICH WOULD BE DESIGNED TO MINIMISE THE PUBLIC IMPACT IN AUSTRALIA AND SHOW PRIVATELY UNDERSTANDING TO INDONESIA OF THEIR PROBLEMS. PERHAPS WE SHOULD ALSO MAKE AN EFFORT TO SECURE THROUGH PARLIAMENT AND THE MEDIA A GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POLICY, AND INDONESIA'S, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT WANT TO BECOME APOLOGISTS FOR INDONESIA.

THE UNITED STATES MIGHT HAVE SOME INFLUENCE ON INDONESIA AT PRESENT AS INDONESIA REALLY WANTS AND NEEDS UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE IN ITS MILITARY RE-EQUIPMENT PROGRAMME. BUT AMBASSADOR NEWSOM TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT HE IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM KISSINGER PERSONALLY NOT TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN DISCUSSIONS ON TIMOR WITH THE INDONESIANS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS INVOLVED IN ENOUGH PROBLEMS OF GREATER IMPORTANCE OVERSEAS AT PRESENT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS, WE UNDERSTAND, INSTRUCTED THE EMBASSY TO CUT DOWN ITS REPORTING ON TIMOR.

I WILL BE SEEING NEWSOM ON MONDAY BUT HIS PRESENT ATTITUDE IS THAT UNITED STATES SHOULD KEEP OUT OF THE PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION AND ALLOW EVENTS TO TAKE THEIR COURSE. HIS SOMEWHAT CYNICAL COMMENT TO ME WAS THAT IF INDONESIA WERE TO INTERVENE THE UNITED STATES WOULD HOPE THEY WOULD DO SO 'EFFECTIVELY, QUICKLY AND NOT USE OUR EQUIPMENT'.

WE ARE ALL AWARE OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE INTEREST IN THE PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION BUT I WONDER WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT HAS ASCERTAINED THE INTEREST OF THE MINISTER OR THE DEPARTMENT OF MINERALS AND ENERGY IN THE TIMOR SITUATION. IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT THIS DEPARTMENT MIGHT WELL HAVE AN INTEREST IN CLOSING THE PRESENT GAP IN THE AGREED SEA BORDER AND THIS COULD BE MUCH MORE READILY NEGOTIATED WITH INDONESIA BY CLOSING THE PRESENT THAN WITH PORTUGAL OR INDEPENDENT PORTUGUESE TIMOR.) ?

I KNOW I AM RECOMMENDING A PRAGMATIC RATHER THAN A PRINCIPLED STAND BUT THAT IS WHAT NATIONAL INTEREST AND FOREIGN POLICY IS ALL ABOUT, AS EVEN THOSE COUNTRIES WITH IDEOLOGICAL BASES FOR THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES, LIKE CHINA AND SOVIET UNION, HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED.

I AM SORRY TO RAISE ALL THESE ISSUES AGAIN WITH YOU PERSONALLY BUT I DO HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF ANOTHER PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE AT THIS STAGE. YOU MAY WISH TO SHOW THIS TO MINISTER AND PRIME MINISTER AND TO REPEAT IT TO COOPER (R.L. COOPER, AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR) IN LISBON.

18 August 1975

V.

SECRET
PORTUGUESE TIMOR

TO CANBERRA

REPEAT LISBON

FROM DJAKARTA

I TALKED LAST NIGHT, 17 AUGUST, WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR (KUZNETSOV) WHO HAS RECENTLY RETURNED FROM MOSCOW, THE PORTUGUESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES (GIRAO) AND MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, GENERAL PANGGABEAN. I ALSO SPOKE THIS MORNING, 18 AUGUST, BRIEFLY WITH THE PRESIDENT AND AT SOME LENGTH WITH UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR NEWSOM.

ON BASIS OF THESE MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS I WOULD LIKE TO PUT FORWARD THE FOLLOWING VIEWS BEFORE LEAVING FOR SUMATRA.

THE PRESIDENT IS AT PRESENT FIRM IN HIS ATTITUDE THAT INDONESIA SHOULD NOT INTERVENE MILITARILY IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR AT THIS STAGE. THE FIRMNESS WITH WHICH HE HOLDS THIS ATTITUDE AT PRESENT HAS SURPRISED AND, I BELIEVE, IRRITATED HANKAM (THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE) AND GENERAL YOGA (GENERAL YOGA SUGAMA, HEAD OF BANKIN). CONCERN ABOUT AUSTRALIA'S REACTION, THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN LIMA, THE FORTHCOMING SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND HIS WISH TO CONCENTRATE INDONESIA'S RESOURCES OF REPELITA II ARE ALL FACTORS IN HIS PRESENT ATTITUDE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT HE HAS BACKED AWAY FROM HIS DECISION THAT TIMOR SHOULD BE INCORPORATED BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE DANGER OF INDONESIAN INTERVENTION UNLESS THERE IS A REAL BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER IN TIMOR.

UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION WILL SEEK TO AVOID ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE PORTUGUESE TIMOR ISSUE ALTHOUGH AMBASSADOR NEWSOM CONSIDERS THAT INDONESIA'S NEED FOR UNITED STATES MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND LIKELY CONGRESSIONAL DISQUIET ABOUT INDONESIAN INTERVENTION COULD, IN ITSELF, EXERCISE AN INFLUENCE ON THE PRESIDENT TO MOVE TOWARDS THE INCORPORATION OF TIMOR AS CAUTIOUSLY AND AS SUBTLY AS POSSIBLE UNLESS THERE IS A TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER IN THE COLONY.

YOGA'S FEARS OF EARLY SOVIET RECOGNITION OF A UDT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE SEEMS AS ILL-FOUNDED AS I HAVE SUSPECTED THEY WERE.

-ACCORDING TO DR GIRAO MAJOR SOARES IS ANGRY AT HIS TREATMENT HERE. STRANGE AS IT MAY SEEM IN THE LIGHT OF MALIK'S ATTITUDE, MALIK DID NOT SEE SOARES BEFORE SOARES LEFT FOR BALI WHERE HE HAS BEEN HELD UP FOR TWO DAYS. AS OF LAST NIGHT HE HAD STILL BEEN UNABLE TO FLY TO KUPANG (CAPITAL OF

WEST TIMOR) AND INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN UNCOOPERATIVE TO AN EXTENT WHICH HAS LED SOARES TO BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE OBSTRUCTING HIM IN HIS EFFORTS TO REACH TIMOR.

DESPITE WHAT YOGA TOLD ME ABOUT INDONESIA'S NON-INVOLVEMENT - WHICH IS, AS YOU KNOW, SUPPORTED BY SENSITIVE SOURCE MATERIAL - PORTUGUESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IS CONVINCED THAT INDONESIA WAS INVOLVED IN THE UDT COUP THROUGH ALI MURTOPO (DEPUTY HEAD OF BAKIN) WHOM HE CONSIDERS TO BE IN LEAGUE WITH UDT, POSSIBLY EVEN WITHOUT YOGA'S OR MALIK'S KNOWLEDGE. DR GIRAO SUGGESTS THAT SOME TIME AGO ALI DECIDED APODETI COULD NOT DELIVER TIMOR TO INDONESIA AND THAT THE REAL DANGER TO INDONESIA'S ASPIRATIONS IN TIMOR WAS FRETILIN. HE THEREFORE STARTED TO BUY OFF MEMBERS OF UDT AND MAKE SECRET ARRANGEMENTS WITH THEM. (I ADMIT THIS ADDS A JAVANESE-MACHIAVELLIAN DIMENSION OF INTRIGUE TO AN ALREADY CONFUSED SITUATION. I CAN ONLY SAY AT THIS STAGE THAT IT IS PLAUSIBLE, IF UNLIKELY. DAN WILL TRY AND EXPLORE THIS FURTHER LATER IN THE WEEK.)

BOTH MAJOR SOARES AND PRESIDENT GOMES WANTED, ACCORDING TO DR GIRAO, THE ARMY OUT OF TIMOR AND WOULD PROBABLY NOW ACCEPT A UDT "GOVERNMENT". DR GIRAO ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO CHANCE NOW THAT PORTUGAL WOULD RE-ESTABLISH FIRM CONTROL IN TIMOR AND REMAIN LONG ENOUGH TO PERMIT AN EVENTUAL DECISION BY THE PEOPLE ON THEIR OWN FUTURE. HE SAID THAT EVEN BEFORE THE UDT ACTION PRESIDENT GOMES HAD REGARDED TIMETABLE AS "FLEXIBLE". COOPER (AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR TO PORTUGAL) MAY WISH TO COMMENT ON THIS.

22 August 1975

VI.

SECRET
PORTUGUESE TIMOR

TO CANBERRA

REPEAT LISBON, WASHINGTON

FROM DJAKARTA

UNITED STATES EMBASSY DEPUTY RIEVES CALLED ON DAN 21 AUGUST. HE SAID AMERICAN AMBASSADOR NEWSOM HAD BEEN GIVEN A BRIEFING ON PORTUGUESE TIMOR BY GENERAL YOGA SUGAMA (BAKIN) ON 20 AUGUST ... RIEVES ALLOWED US TO TAKE NOTES OF NEWSOM'S CABLED REPORT. FOLLOWING IS OUR RECONSTRUCTION OF IT.

YOGA SAID THAT BAKIN AND THE CIA HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF ENGINEERING RECENT EVENTS IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR. HE STRONGLY DENIED THIS.

THERE WAS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND INDONESIA THAT THE DECOLONISATION PROCESS IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A MANNER REFLECTING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AND WITHOUT DISTURBING POLITICAL STABILITY. PORTUGAL HAD A MORAL OBLIGATION TO PREPARE THE PEOPLE IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR FOR THE END OF PORTUGUESE SOVEREIGNTY.

YOGA OUTLINED THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS:

FIRST, IF UDT PROVED TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE PRESENT STRUGGLE THE FRETILIN WOULD REACT AND APODETI WOULD INEVITABLY BE DRAWN IN. A CHAOTIC SITUATION WOULD UNFOLD OFFERING WIDE-RANGING POSSIBILITIES FOR OUTSIDE POWERS TO HAVE DIRECT OR INDIRECT INFLUENCE IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR. IN THIS RESPECT YOGA MENTIONED THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA.

SECONDLY, IF UDT UNDERTOOK ACTION IN CONCERT WITH GROUPS IN PORTUGAL THEN A FUTURE INDEPENDENT PORTUGUESE TIMOR COULD NOT BE NEUTRAL. IT WOULD BE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THESE GROUPS IN PORTUGAL ITSELF.

THIRDLY, IF UDT AND APODETI HAD UNITED TO FIGHT FRETILIN THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING.

YOGA SAID THAT UDT COULD BE DESCRIBED AS SOCIALIST AND FRETILIN AS COMMUNIST. THE SOCIALISTS IN LISBON WERE PRO-MOSCOW WHILE THE COMMUNISTS WERE PRE-PEKING. BAKIN HAD PROOF THAT UDT WAS STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THE SOCIALIST GROUP IN LISBON. INDONESIA HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CLARIFY FROM THE PORTUGUESE THE SITUATION IN TIMOR. IT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT THE PRESENT PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT SAW AS ITS OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR OR HOW PORTUGAL INTENDED TO FULFIL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES.